




This paper offers a policy solution to reduce price volatility in markets for renewable energy 
certificates (RECs), which have been historically characterized by severe fluctuations.  This 
volatility has resulted from a vertical demand curve for RECs.  I propose replacing the current 
regulatory structure with an emissions rate standard that would connect RECs to carbon dioxide 
emissions.  This paper demonstrates that a rate standard will create a downward-sloping demand 
curve for certificates by giving generators the option to abate pollution or buy certificates.  A 
downward-sloping demand curve is key to limiting price volatility over time.  I build a 
theoretical model for certificate demand based on my constructed rate standard constraint and 
use a stochastic certificate generation model from Coulon et al. (2015) to model the price of 
certificates over time.  This paper then demonstrates, using a dynamic programming algorithm 




Cap-and-trade systems for carbon emissions and carbon taxes have garnered the most 
attention as market-based solutions for reducing carbon emissions.  However, in the United 
States at least, these strategies have been politically difficult to implement.  Many states have 
turned, instead, to renewable portfolio standards (RPS), under which the government requires 
load-serving entities (electric utilities) to procure a certain percentage of their electricity from 
renewable sources.  These standards have been introduced to promote the development of 
renewable energy sources like wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal.  Several states have 
introduced tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs) to facilitate meeting these standards.  
Renewable energy certificates are issued to renewable energy generators for each megawatt-hour 
(MWh) of electricity they produce.  These certificates can then be purchased in the REC 
marketplace by electric utilities, who can use the certificates to meet their annual RPS 
requirements.  A penalty is imposed on load-serving entities who fail to meet their RPS 
requirement.  The emergence and rapid growth of REC markets suggests that they may be an 
important policy alternative to emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes. 
A study of New Jersey’s solar renewable energy certificate (SREC) market has shown, 
however, that the current market design for RECs has resulted in highly volatile certificate prices 
(Coulon et al. 2015).  Price volatility makes renewable energy a riskier, higher cost investment 
than it would be if certificate prices were stable.  While some price volatility is natural with any 
quantity-based regulation, markets for renewable energy certificates are particularly susceptible 
to large, rapid price swings from nearly zero to the penalty price (Coulon et al. 2015).  This price 
volatility stems from a vertical demand curve for RECs (Khazaei et al. 2016; Felder and Loxley 
2012; Marchenko 2008).  The demand curve for RECs is vertical because the annual renewable 
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requirements are fixed and do not vary with the price (Felder and Loxley 2012).  Markets for 
RECs are also characterized by a price floor of zero (renewable energy generators can always 
choose not to sell their RECs so they would never sell them for a negative price) and a price 
ceiling equal to the compliance penalty (load-serving entities will never pay more than the 
penalty for RECs because they can simply pay the penalty instead).  Due to the vertical demand 
curve, small changes in supply can significantly affect prices.  Small supply changes are 
represented by leftward and rightward shifts of the supply curve for RECs, which is also vertical 
in the short-run.  Theoretically, equilibrium exists only at a price of zero and at a price equal to 
the penalty with no equilibrium between the two, as shown in Figure 1.  If there is an oversupply 
of RECs, the price will be essentially zero, and if there is an undersupply of RECs the price will 
equal the penalty fee (Felder and Loxley 2012).  Coulon et. al (2015) show that prices for SRECs 
in New Jersey have fluctuated enough to suggest that REC demand is approximately described 
by a vertical curve.  The short-run supply curve is vertical because renewable energy generators 
do not choose how much electricity to produce based on price.  If the sun is shining or the wind 
is blowing, renewable generators are producing electricity and creating RECs in the process.  In 
a single period, this electricity production may vary stochastically with weather, but it is 
otherwise fixed at a certain level of generation.  In the long-term however, the supply curve for 
RECs is upward-sloping because more generators can choose to enter the market at higher REC 




Figure 1. For a single period, REC markets have a vertical demand curve as shown. When there is an undersupply 
(S1) of certificates, the REC price is equal to the penalty price SACP (solar alternative compliance penalty). When 
there is an oversupply (S2) of certificates, the REC price is zero. 
In this paper, I propose replacing traditional renewable portfolio standards with emissions 
rate standards in order to create a downward-sloping demand curve for renewable energy 
certificates.  A rate standard will require electricity generators to reduce their carbon emissions 
to a specified amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) per MWh.  Under this model, electricity 
generators have two choices to meet their emissions rate standard:  (1) reduce emissions per 
MWh through abatement or (2) purchase RECs.  I create a theoretical model and use this to show 
that rate standards will result in a downward-sloping demand curve for RECs.  Then I test this 
model using the dynamic programming algorithm outlined by Coulon et al. (2015) to show that 
price volatility is reduced relative to New Jersey’s current regulatory model. 
Several papers have discussed the price volatility of markets for renewable energy 
certificates in the United States and for green certificates in Europe.  Some have proposed 
methods of reducing this price volatility by implementing price collars (Felder and Loxley 2012), 
allowing certificates to be banked (Amundsen et al. 2006), and implementing an adjustable 
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compliance penalty and adaptive REC requirement that vary with price (Khazaei et al. 2016).  
Other papers have looked at rate standards as a type of carbon emissions reduction regulations 
and have compared them to cap-and-trade schemes (Bushnell et al. 2015; Burtraw et al. 2012). 
However, no paper has examined implementing rate standards as a method of reducing price 
volatility in renewable energy certificate markets.   
My paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the implementation of emissions 
rate standards for renewable energy generation is a potential solution for limiting price volatility 
and making renewable energy a less risky investment.  While rate standards are not a new policy, 
implementing emissions rate standards as a method of reducing price volatility in renewable 
energy certificate markets is a new idea.  The ultimate goal of most environmental markets is to 
reduce pollution.  This is especially true for carbon markets and renewable energy policies.  
Carbon markets serve to reduce carbon emissions in order to slow climate change.  Renewable 
energy certificate markets and other policies such as portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs serve 
to encourage the growth of clean energy, which can indirectly result in less emissions from dirty 
fossil fuel-fired plants as these plants are phased out over time.  However, the production of 
renewable energy does not by itself lead to any decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.  By 
directly linking the generation of renewable energy to carbon emissions through an emissions 
rate standard, my policy both incentivizes the creation of clean energy and the reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions from dirty power producers.  Under my policy, electricity producers 
can choose the most cost-effective method of reaching the rate standard but they must either 
reduce emissions or buy renewable energy certificates.   
This paper could also be important for New Jersey if it chooses to comply with the EPA 
Clean Power Plan (CPP).  New Jersey participated in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
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(RGGI), a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide emissions from electric power plants in the 
northeastern United States, until 2011 when it withdrew from the program.  The CPP gives states 
the option of reducing emissions through cap-and-trade or rate standards, and since New Jersey 
has abandoned cap-and-trade, it seems likely that it would turn to rate standards.  My policy 
design is such that New Jersey would only have to modify its existing SREC program to 
implement rate standards rather than starting a new, separate program for carbon emissions. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, I present a case for why this paper is important by 
illustrating the existing price volatility in New Jersey’s SREC market.  Second, the paper 
discusses the current literature available on renewable energy certificate markets, New Jersey’s 
SREC price volatility, similar green certificate markets, and emissions rate standards.  Third, I 
introduce a theoretical model for a single period where the REC requirement and penalty are 
replaced by an emissions rate standard.  In the next section, the demand portion of the model is 
extended across time, and the SREC generation function presented in Coulon et al. (2015) is 
used as a model of REC supply.  By modifying the dynamic programming algorithm from the 
same authors to accommodate my demand function, I demonstrate that a rate standard can reduce 
price volatility in REC markets.  This is presented in the results section. 
2. Price Volatility in Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) Markets 
Data collected on New Jersey’s solar renewable energy certificate (SREC) market 
demonstrates that prices have rapidly fluctuated since the introduction of certificates in 2005.  
This price volatility, sometimes in the form of severe price swings, has led to high variation in 
the creation of new SRECs over time.  In other words, price fluctuations are causing 
corresponding fluctuations in certificate issuance rates.  The implication here is that price 
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volatility causes high risk to participants in the market for renewable energy certificates and may 
potentially lead to less investment in renewable power generation.   
The supply of certificates in time period 𝑡 depends on the certificate price in time period 
𝑡 − 1.  The higher the certificate price in the previous period, the greater the renewable 
generation capacity installed in the current period.  From the perspective of government 
regulators, we would like to see relatively stable prices to encourage stable growth of renewable 
energy generation.   
Figure 2 shows large, rapid fluctuations in daily average SREC prices over time.  Within 
each day, prices are just as volatile, sometimes dropping from the penalty price to zero in only 
hours.  Figure 3 displays the corresponding volatility in SREC issuance rates.  An SREC is 
issued every time a MWh of electricity is produced from solar power.  Issuance rates can 
therefore be thought of as the growth of solar power.  Based on these two graphs, there appears 
to be some relationship between the volatility in SREC prices and the fluctuations in solar 
growth.  Figure 4, taken from Coulon et al. (2015), displays a clear relationship between the 
annual growth rate of new solar installations and the average SREC price in the previous year.  
This suggests that there is approximately a one-year lag between when SREC prices and the 
issuance of certificates.  Feedback from prices onto generation is not immediate due to new 
project construction time, which can take at least several months.  Some feedback could be 
immediate if generators strategically supply SRECs according to market prices (i.e. supply more 




Figure 2. Daily average SREC prices in New Jersey for the period 2007-2015. The dark blue lines indicate the 
penalty price for each energy year. The different colored lines indicate the prices for SRECs according to the energy 
year in which they were issued. Data obtained from NJ Clean Energy Program. 
 
Figure 3. Annualized monthly SREC issuance rate over the period 2007-2015.  The dark blue lines (dots) indicate 
the SREC requirement (number of SRECs necessary to meet compliance) for each energy year. Data obtained from 
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Figure 4. The blue line graph (left axis) shows the annual growth rate of new solar installations in New Jersey over 
the period 2008-14.  The red bar graph (right axis) shows the average SREC price in the previous year.  This figure 
was obtained from Coulon et al. (2015). 
These figures demonstrate that there is clearly a relationship between historical prices of 
renewable energy certificates and the growth of the solar industry in New Jersey.  Since 
investment in renewable energy appears to be tied to investors’ expectations of certificate prices, 
price volatility is a major concern if renewable growth is the ultimate goal.  This provides the 
motivation for my policy proposal to limit price volatility and create stable prices in order to 
stimulate the renewable energy sector. 
3. Literature Review 
Coulon et al. (2015) examine the price volatility of New Jersey’s solar renewable energy 
certificates (SRECs) in the paper “SMART-SREC: A stochastic model of the New Jersey solar 
renewable energy certificate market.”  First, the authors study the price history of New Jersey’s 
SRECs, accounting for the numerous regulatory changes that have occurred since the 
introduction of certificates in 2005.  The price history demonstrates that there is a clear 
relationship between price and generation growth rates although this is complicated by the time 
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lag present in the market’s response to price movements.  Second, the authors build stochastic 
models called SMART-SREC for SREC prices and for SREC generation.  Central to these 
models is a feedback feature in which the price is a function of generation and the generation 
model is a function of price.  Using New Jersey’s historical price data, the authors estimate the 
parameters of the models and determine the optimal time lag parameter.  This paper’s main 
contribution is twofold: (1) it shows the high sensitivity of SREC prices to market design and 
market participant behavior and (2) it proposes a stochastic model with reasonable parameter 
estimates that replicates historical price movements.  I use their stochastic generation model in 
my paper as a model of certificate generation (or supply) over time.  I also replicate, and then 
adapt, the dynamic programming algorithm these authors use to generate price surfaces for 
various combinations of certificates banked and certificates generated.  Ultimately, the 
adaptation of this algorithm allows me to prove that my model can reduce price volatility. 
Felder and Loxley (2012) briefly explore the problems associated with a vertical demand 
curve for New Jersey’s SRECs.  Then the authors provide a discussion of different possible 
solutions to these problems such as imposing a price floor, increasing solar requirements, 
increasing the amount of long-term solar contracts, and encouraging banking of certificates.  
However, they conclude that none of these methods would ultimately be successful at reducing 
price volatility.  They argue that the only solution to excessive price fluctuations is to implement 
a downward-sloping demand curve for SRECs.  They propose adjusting the life of SRECs based 
on market conditions as a mechanism for creating this sloped demand curve (Felder and Loxley 
2012).  This paper is only a rough qualitative sketch—it fails to provide a theoretical basis for its 
conclusions and the proposed model is largely undeveloped. 
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In the paper “ADAPT: A Price-stabilizing Compliance Policy for Renewable Energy 
Certificates,” Khazaei et al. (2016) develop a model for a downward-sloping demand curve as 
suggested by Felder and Loxley (2012).  The model Khazaei et al. create depends on a sloped 
penalty function, which they call an Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets 
(ADAPT) policy.  Under this policy proposal, the penalty price would be a function of the total 
number of submitted RECs in the energy year and the compliance requirement would be 
determined based on the size of the certificate surplus or shortage of the previous year.  The 
authors use the same SREC generation model they developed in Coulon et al. (2015).  By 
creating a dynamic programming model and deriving properties of the market, the authors are 
able to compare how different market designs affect price level and volatility.  They conclude 
that the ADAPT model with a downward-sloping demand curve can significantly reduce price 
volatility and ensure stable long-run prices (Khazaei et al. 2016). 
Amundsen et al. (2006) investigate the extent to which price volatility can be reduced if 
certificates are allowed to be banked in their paper “Price Volatility and Banking in Green 
Certificate Markets.”  The authors also study the effects of certificate banking and speculation on 
consumer, producer, and social surplus.  Their findings suggest that banking may considerably 
reduce price volatility and also lead to increased social surplus (Amundsen et al. 2006).  
However, data from New Jersey, where SREC banking has been allowed since 2008, has shown 
that banking has done little to reduce the price volatility of certificates.  One potential cause of 
banking’s failure to reduce price volatility is that while banking is allowed, borrowing is not.  
Renewable energy certificates can be held and banked for future use; however, certificates 
cannot be borrowed from future years—a utility cannot buy a certificate from the next year when 
that certificate has not even been created.  Since the future supply of certificates is a random 
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variable, it is reasonable to prohibit borrowing.  This is unlike carbon emissions markets, in 
which borrowing is allowed because the amount of permits available for the next year is a known 
quantity.  Additionally, failing to meet the certificate requirement in the current year does not 
imply a certificate debt for the next year because the utility would just pay the penalty fee.  This 
means that banking does not change the upper bound on prices—the penalty fee remains the 
upper price bound for certificates (Coulon et al. 2015).  As a measure by itself, banking does not 
appear to be the solution for reducing price volatility, although it may help if combined with 
another measure. 
In the EPA’s Clean Power Plan released this year, the EPA calls for significant emissions 
reductions and sets targets for each state to reach by 2030 (Bushnell et al. 2015).  These targets 
are emissions rate-based CO2 goals, which is the type of standard I am proposing in my paper.  
Although the EPA set state-specific targets, it gives states the freedom to determine what policies 
they will implement to reach those goals.  Bushnell et al. (2015) compare rate standards to cap-
and-trade and analyze the effects of states joining together to implement their goals versus acting 
individually.  The authors develop a model of electricity generation and consumption in multiple 
states and modify the model to apply it to cap-and-trade and rate-standard scenarios.  They also 
apply the model to the case of mixed regulation in which some states adopt cap-and-trade 
policies and others adopt rate standards.  I use aspects of their model in my theoretical work.  
Additionally, Bushnell et al. (2015) assume that renewable energy generation is part of the 
“uncovered” sector, which means renewable energy sources are not eligible for emissions credit 
payments because they are not explicitly covered in the Clean Power Plan.  I amend this for my 
work since my paper focuses specifically on certificates for renewable energy generators 
(Bushnell et al. 2015).   
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4. Theoretical Model 
I develop a theoretical model for the renewable energy certificate market when rate 
standards are the government-imposed regulation instead of renewable portfolio standards.  My 
theoretical work shows that the rate standard model creates a downward sloping demand curve 
for RECs and, as a result, limits REC price volatility.   
The economic agents in this model are electricity generators—both renewable and non-
renewable.  We begin with the assumption that renewable power producers and other electricity 
generators are trying to maximize profits.  I start by considering a simple single-period 
theoretical model.  Later, I extend this model to adjust for additional factors including certificate 
price history, stochastic renewable energy production, certificate banking. 
4.1. Variables and Notation 
I use the following notation and variables. 
Indices: Time is indexed by t, where one month is the smallest time step (∆𝑡 =
1
12
) because New 
Jersey’s SREC generation data is monthly.  The energy year—the year the certificate is used to 
meet compliance—is indexed by 𝑦 ∈ ℕ.  Each of N electricity generators is indexed by i.   
Prices:  The market price of a certificate at time t used to meet compliance in energy year y is 
denoted 𝑝𝑐,𝑡,𝑦.  This price is determined endogenously by my theoretical model in the single-
period framework and by the dynamic programming algorithm in the multi-period framework.  
Certificate prices are measured in dollars per certificate ($/REC), where each certificate 
represents one MWh of renewable electricity generation.  The wholesale price of electricity at 
time t is denoted 𝑝𝑒,𝑡.  I use the wholesale electricity price (rather than the retail price) because 
this is the price at which electricity producers sell electricity to the grid.  I assume a perfectly 
competitive market; hence, 𝑝𝑒,𝑡 is determined exogenously by the overall supply and demand of 
Harris 14 
 
electricity.  The wholesale price of electricity is measured in dollars per MWh of electricity sold 
($/MWh). 
Emissions rates:  The carbon dioxide emissions rate for electricity generator i is denoted 𝛽𝑖 and 
is measured in pounds of CO2 per MWh of electricity generated (lbs CO2/MWh).  I assume each 
firm’s emissions rate is constant over time; any emissions abatement achieved is accounted for in 
the emissions reduction variable 𝑒𝑟, defined below, so it would be double-counting to include it 
as a reduction in the actual emissions rate.  My proposed policy mechanism, a rate standard set 
by a regulator, is denoted 𝜎𝑡 and has units lbs CO2/MWh.  In the multi-period model, the rate 
standard is modeled by a continuous decreasing function so the standard becomes stricter over 
time. 
Power plant emissions rate data indicates that carbon dioxide emissions rates from power 
plants on the grid that supplies New Jersey with electricity have not changed much over the past 
five years.  This is shown in the Figure 5.  This helps validate the decision to have 𝛽𝑖 remain 









Figure 5. Carbon dioxide emissions rate data from the period 2012-2014 for the PJM Interconnection, which 
supplies New Jersey's electricity. The gray line, which represents the average emissions rate across all power plants 
on the grid, indicates that the emissions rate has remained fairly constant at approximately 1,100 pounds of CO2 per 
MWh since 2012. 
Quantities:  The quantity of electricity sold by each generator i in time t is represented by 𝑞𝑒,𝑖,𝑡 
and is measured in MWh.  Similarly, the quantity of certificates sold by each generator i in time t 
is represented by 𝑞𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 and is measured in RECs where one REC stands for one MWh of 
electricity production.  Note that while all generators sell electricity, only renewable generators 
create certificates, so 𝑞𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 will be zero for all non-renewable generators. 
Emissions reductions:  Under my model, a firm can buy certificates, reduce emissions, or both in 
order to meet the rate standard.  The emissions reductions achieved by firm i in time t are 
denoted 𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡.  Emissions reductions can be reached through carbon abatement measures such as 
installing carbon dioxide scrubbers in power plant smokestacks, switching fuel sources (e.g. 




Parameters:   
 The interest rate is denoted by r.  I assume the interest rate is 𝑟 = 0.02 for this paper. 
 Each firm faces costs of reducing carbon emissions through abatement.  These costs are 
known as abatement costs.  We assume that the marginal abatement cost function is 





 The installed capacity of SREC generation at time t is denoted ?̂?𝑡. 
 The accumulated number of SRECs banked at time t is denoted 𝑏𝑡. 
Decision variable: 
Each electricity generator chooses how many certificates to submit at each compliance date 
according to their individual certificate demand functions.  They will choose the least costly 
combination of emissions abatement and RECs.  The number of certificates each firm i chooses 
to submit at time t is denoted 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. 
4.2. Constraint: Carbon Emissions Rate Standard 
New Jersey currently sets a fixed requirement for the amount of solar-generated electricity a 
utility must produce each year, or, in other words, the number of SRECs that must be submitted 
each year.  I remove this requirement on utilities and instead place a rate standard requirement on 
electricity producers.  In order to create a downward-sloping demand curve, I propose an 
emissions rate standard of the form below that will act as a constraint on dirty electricity 
producers.   
𝜎 =





This standard is set such that 𝜎 < ?̅?, so a significant number of electricity producers will be 
required to reduce their emissions to meet the standard.  Firms whose emissions rates are higher 
than the standard (𝛽𝑖 > 𝜎) must either buy certificates (increase 𝑞𝑐,𝑖) or abate carbon dioxide 
emissions (increase 𝑒𝑟,𝑖).  Under this policy, each REC directly offsets one MWh of electricity 
production from dirty power sources.  Similarly, one unit of emissions reduction (pound of CO2) 
directly offsets one unit of emissions production.  A generator’s total emissions, accounting for 
these offsets, is then divided by the quantity of electricity it produces 𝑞𝑒,𝑖, and it must be equal to 
or less than the mandatory emissions rate standard.  Firms whose emissions rates are lower than 
the standard (𝛽𝑖 < 𝜎) are in compliance and they do not have to perform any additional action.  
The rate standard above assumes electricity producers have the ability to abate emissions.  It also 
assumes that the quantity of electricity produced by each firm is constant and determined 
exogenously from this decision about how many certificates to buy and how much pollution to 
abate.  Considering that a majority of producers who fail to meet the rate standard are baseload 
producers, it is reasonable to assume their electricity production is fixed. 
  We check this functional form to ensure that reducing emissions and buying certificates 
allow a firm to meet the rate standard.  Consider the function below 
𝑓(𝑞𝑐,𝑖, 𝑒𝑟,𝑖) =
𝛽𝑖(𝑞𝑒,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑐,𝑖) − 𝑒𝑟,𝑖
𝑞𝑒,𝑖
 
where 𝑓(𝑞𝑐,𝑖, 𝑒𝑟,𝑖) describes firm i’s actual emissions rate taking into account the certificates it 
















Both partial derivatives are negative, which indicates increasing the number of certificates a firm 
purchases or increasing a firm’s emissions reductions will cause the firm’s effective emissions 
rate to decrease.  In other words, a firm whose emissions rate is higher than the standard 𝜎 can 
meet the standard by buying certificates or abating emissions (or both).  
4.3. Electricity Generators 
In order to create a demand function for RECs, we begin with the assumption that electricity 
producers are profit-maximizing firms.  In this scenario, electricity production is exogenously 
determined and firms are choosing how many certificates to buy and how much to abate.  The 
profit maximization problem for such a firm is below. 
max
𝑞𝑐,𝑖,𝑒𝑟,𝑖
(𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑒,𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑒,𝑖) − 𝐶(𝑞𝑐,𝑖, 𝑒𝑟.𝑖)) 














2 − 𝐶(𝑞𝑐,𝑖, 𝑒𝑟.𝑖)) 
The remaining cost function in this problem includes the costs of buying RECs and the costs of 
reducing emissions.  It has the form 
𝐶(𝑞𝑐,𝑖, 𝑒𝑟.𝑖) = 𝐴𝐶(𝑒𝑟,𝑖) + 𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐,𝑖 
Here 𝐴𝐶(𝑒𝑟,𝑖) is the firm’s abatement cost function, which describes the costs to a firm of 
reducing pollution by an amount 𝑒𝑟,𝑖.  The firm’s abatement cost function is equivalent to the 
area under the firm’s marginal abatement cost curve, which describes the costs to the firm of 
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reducing pollution by one additional unit.  For simplicity, I assume the generator’s marginal 
abatement cost function is isoelastic with parameter 𝜆.  In other words, 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑒𝑟,𝑖) = 𝑒𝑟,𝑖
𝜆 .  Thus, 








Additionally, we can rewrite the emissions constraint 𝜎 =
𝛽𝑖(𝑞𝑒,𝑖−𝑞𝑐,𝑖)−𝑒𝑟,𝑖
𝑞𝑒,𝑖
 in terms of 𝑒𝑟,𝑖. 
𝑒𝑟,𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖(𝑞𝑒,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑐,𝑖) − 𝜎𝑞𝑒,𝑖 














This allows us to rewrite the firm’s costs as a function of only the quantity of certificates it 
purchases.   





Because the quantity of electricity produced is exogenous, maximizing a generator’s profits is 








Therefore, we take the first order condition and solve for 𝑞𝑐,𝑖. 
𝑞𝑐,𝑖 =








This function is one individual generator’s demand for certificates in a single-period model.  I 
assume that the individual firm is an average electricity generator and that it has the average 












To find the aggregate demand function for certificates, we sum the individual demand over all N 




= 𝑁𝑞?̅? = 𝑁
















where 𝑄𝑒 is the total amount of electricity produced (MWh) in the single period.  
From this we can also solve for the inverse demand function where 𝑄𝑐 is the total number of 
certificates produced in a single period. 
𝑝𝑐 = ?̅? (





We graph this function, which is downward sloping, in the following section. 
4.4. Equilibrium 
For the purposes of a single-period model, we can assume the supply of certificates is fixed, as 
renewable energy producers cannot increase or decrease production based on certificate prices.  
Rather, the short-term supply of renewable electricity is determined only by natural processes 
(the availability of sunlight, weather patterns, etc.).  Generators cannot install more production 
capacity in a single period, so we consider the supply fixed.  In order to obtain an equilibrium 
price, we can set this fixed supply 𝑆 = 𝑥 equal to demand, which we defined above.   
𝑆 = 𝑥 =












𝑝𝑐 = ?̅? (





We can glean a few pieces of information from this function.  First, certificate price responds 
inversely to changes in the emissions rate standard 𝜎.  Lowering the rate standard (making the 
requirement stricter) causes the price of certificates to increase.   
 
Figure 6. Downward sloping demand curve for certificates.  Note this demand curve assumes 𝜆 = 1.  This 
assumption makes graphing easier but is not necessary to produce a downward sloping curve.  The curve will be 
downward sloping regardless of the choice of 𝜆. 
 For practical policy purposes, this equilibrium condition allows regulators to predict the 
price of certificates for a certain period based on the rate standard they set if they know the 
current average emissions rate ?̅? of utilities, the quantity of electricity demanded, the number of 
renewable and non-renewable electricity generators, and the parameter 𝜆 of the marginal 
abatement cost curve for electricity generators.  The regulator likely knows the first four values 
at any given time; however, the regulator’s knowledge of generators’ marginal abatement costs is 
likely limited.  While the regulator could require each generator to report its abatement costs, 
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generators would likely overestimate their costs in order to see a less strict emissions rate 
standard. 
5. Multi-period Model 
The purpose of this paper is to show that emissions rate standards can be applied to New Jersey’s 
SREC market to reduce price volatility of certificates over time.  So far, we have only shown that 
a rate standard produces a downward-sloping demand curve for certificates in a single period.  In 
order to determine if price volatility may be reduced, we extend our demand function across time 
and follow the methods of the SMART-SREC paper by Coulon et al. (2015) to examine price 
surfaces at different points in time.  The certificate demand function, from Section 4.3, becomes 
𝑥𝑡 =








where 𝑥𝑡 represents the number of certificates submitted to meet compliance at time t.  We 
assume total electricity demand 𝑄𝑒 is constant across years, which is not unreasonable based on 
historical data.  Additionally, I design the emissions rate standard 𝜎𝑡 to decrease 2 percent each 
year in order to achieve environmental policy goals of significantly reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions.  The functional form for 𝜎𝑡 is 
𝜎𝑡 = 0.98
𝑡 12⁄ ?̅? 
Certificates will only be submitted at compliance dates (when 
𝑡
12
∈ ℕ) so the rate standard really 
only matters at the end of each energy year and could be written as a discontinuous function such 
as 𝜎𝑡 = 0.98
⌈𝑡 12⁄ ⌉?̅?.  However, it is simpler to write it as the continuous function above, as 
continuous functions are more convenient to work with. 
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  Coulon et al. (2015) observe that SREC generation is driven by stochastic processes and 
they develop a model for the generation of certificates 𝑔𝑡 (SREC/year): 




This is simply a model of the supply of SRECs each year.  The sine and cosine functions in this 
model capture the seasonality of SREC generation and the feedback price 𝑝?̅? represents some 
increasing function of historical prices.  In other words, SREC generation varies according to 
daylight and weather conditions.  Generation also depends on SREC market prices, as higher 
recent prices lead to increased installation capacity of solar power.  The last term 𝜀𝑡 represents 
noise and is estimated to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 0.035 
(𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,0.035)).  Coulon et al. (2015) estimate the parameters 𝑎0,…,𝑎6, and these estimates are 
presented in Table 1. 
Parameter 𝒂𝟎 𝒂𝟏 𝒂𝟐 𝒂𝟑 𝒂𝟒 𝒂𝟓 𝒂𝟔 
Estimated value 10.9558 -0.1209 0.0900 0.2151 0.3859 -0.0151 1.27 × 10-3 
Confidence 
intervals (95%) 
10.5385 -0.1875 0.0235 0.1486 0.3184 -0.1923 0.94 × 10-3 
11.3730 -0.0543 0.1565 0.2816 0.4535 0.1621 1.60 × 10-3 
Table 1. Parameter values for stochastic SREC generation model from Coulon et al. (2015). 
The generation model for the annualized instantaneous generation rate 𝑔𝑡 can be rewritten by 
exponentiating each side of the equation to obtain 
𝑔𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡(𝑝) exp(𝑎1𝑠𝑖 𝑛(4𝜋𝑡) + 𝑎2 𝑐𝑜𝑠(4𝜋𝑡) + 𝑎3 𝑠𝑖𝑛(2𝜋𝑡) + 𝑎4 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2𝜋𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡) 
where ?̂?𝑡 is the installed generation at time t and it evolves according to  
?̂?𝑡+𝛥𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 exp(𝑎5𝛥𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑝𝑡𝛥𝑡). 
Because New Jersey allows SRECs to be banked, I allow that in this model as well.  The 
number of accumulated SRECs banked from previous years plus the amount banked in the 








 max(0, 𝑏𝑡−1 +∫ 𝑔𝑢𝑑𝑢
𝑡
𝑡−𝑡




,                         𝑡 ∉ ℕ
 
Recall that certificates are submitted for compliance at the end of each energy year (when 𝑡 ∈ ℕ).  
Thus, the first line of this function indicates the number of certificates banked just after the 
certificates (𝑥𝑡) are submitted for compliance.  The second line is the sum of the certificates 
banked from previous years and the number generated so far in the current year. 
 Whereas the current model and the model proposed in ADAPT by Khazaei et al. (2016) 
rely on a penalty function, my model only relies on the rate standard.  However, in order to 
simulate my model using those authors’ algorithm, I rewrite my demand function as an 








,    𝑡 ∈ ℕ
0,                                            𝑡 ∉ ℕ
 




−𝑟𝛥𝑡𝔼𝑡[𝑝𝑡+𝛥𝑡,𝑦]) ,  𝑡 ≤ 𝑦 + 𝜏
0,                                                                    𝑡 > 𝑦 + 𝜏
 
Recall the vintage year is the energy year in which the certificate was issued.  With a lengthy 
banking period of five years allowed before a certificate expires, it is highly unlikely that a firm 
would hold onto a certificate long enough for it to expire.  When it is time to meet compliance, a 
firm will submit its oldest certificates first (this is known as the first in, first out “FIFO” principle 
and is proved in Khazaei et al. (2016)).  This means that the possibility of the price of a 
certificate being zero because it is expired is basically zero; nevertheless, we include it for 
completeness.   
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5.1. Dynamic Programming Algorithm 
I follow the method described in SMART-SREC by Coulon et al. (2015) and in ADAPT by 
Khazaei et al. (2016) to examine price volatility.  First, I tested the algorithm to ensure that it 
would replicate the results of those two papers.  The algorithm for solving for the price surface at 
each unit in time works as follows.  I begin by discretizing space in the dimensions of 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡 
by choosing a grid of values for those state variables, and I discretize time in monthly steps for a 
five-year period.  I similarly discretize the Normal distribution of the noise 𝜀𝑡.  Then I initialize 
the program by evaluating the price of an SREC at the end if its five-year life.  The algorithm 
then works backwards through time, solving the martingale condition at each grid point:  
𝑝𝑡,𝑦 = 𝑒
−𝑟𝛥𝑡𝔼𝑡[𝑝𝑡+𝛥𝑡,𝑦].  Matlab’s root finding function “fzero” is used to iteratively solve this 
fixed-point problem (Coulon et al. 2015).  Figure 7 shows a price surface generated by the 
algorithm for a given month under New Jersey’s current regulations.  The price surfaces at 
various times t of SREC prices based on my model and generated by the dynamic programming 
algorithm are presented in Figure 8. 
 






Figure 8.  Price surfaces at various times t under my model. 
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These price surfaces show that SREC prices are much more stable over time, ranging between 
$95 to $100 per certificate, under my policy proposal than currently in New Jersey where prices 
range from $0 to that year’s penalty price.  Prices do not drop to zero until just months before the 
certificate is due to expire.  However, certificates this old will likely have been submitted for 
compliance by this time, so the likelihood of the price actually reaching zero is slim.  These 
results suggest that price volatility would be reduced by implementing an emissions rate standard 
for renewable energy certificates.  This is further demonstrated by Figures 9 and 10.  Figure 9 
shows the simulated price of certificates over a five-year period based on the current regulatory 
scheme in New Jersey.  Figure 10 shows the simulated certificate price over the same period 
with my rate standard mechanism replacing the existing regulation. 
 
Figure 9. Certificate price over time using Coulon et al. (2015) model with New Jersey's current step-mechanism.  
Under this regulatory scheme, the average monthly price (blue) ranges between $75 and $200 per certificate.  The 




Figure 10. Certificate price over time using my model.  Under the rate standard policy, the average monthly price 
(blue) has a much smaller range from $95 to $100.   
According to these simulations, price volatility appears to be significantly reduced under 
a rate standard policy (Figure 9) compared to New Jersey’s current regulatory scheme (Figure 8).  
Furthermore, these graphs display the average monthly prices, so prices are likely much more 
volatile than the averages indicate.  The minimum and maximum monthly prices are important in 
this regard because the prices range between those bounds, which are much closer to each other 
under the rate standard proposal.  In other words, the rate standard appears to set tight restrictions 
on the range and volatility of certificate prices, which is the result we were looking for. 
One important caveat is the long-term generation growth rate and the generation 
function’s parameter values, all of which were adapted from Coulon et al. (2015), may 
significantly change in the future as solar penetration into the market increases.  This could cause 
the generation model to need recalibration and may alter our results.  However, for the present 




New Jersey’s SREC market is a leading model for renewable energy certificate markets 
in the United States.  Other states and regions will be looking to New Jersey to see how it deals 
with price volatility in this market.  Policymakers and researchers continue to search for optimal 
regulatory policies to reduce price fluctuations in certificate markets, and so far New Jersey has 
been one of several testing grounds for such policies.  As renewable energy certificate markets 
and similar markets continue to grow as a method of incentivizing renewable energy production 
in order to combat climate change, solving the volatility problem will become even more 
important. 
In my paper, I have proposed a potential solution to this problem.  I propose 
implementing an emissions rate standard for carbon dioxide emissions that electricity generators 
can meet by buying renewable energy certificates.  Simulations of my model based on the 
dynamic programming algorithm found in the SMART-SREC paper by Coulon et al. (2015) 
suggest that REC price volatility is reduced under a rate standard.  More research is necessary to 
confirm this finding, but my work gives good indications that replacing a fixed requirement and 
penalty function with an emissions rate standard would create in a downward-sloping demand 
curve for certificates and result in less price volatility.  Reducing price volatility is important for 
potential investors in renewable energy who see stable prices as an encouraging sign of lower 
risk. 
There are a few additional points to note.  In future work, I would like to compare the 
costs of meeting the emissions rate standard to the costs of meeting the current SREC regulatory 
standard.  Khazaei et al. (2016) prove that their alternative policy proposal always results in a 
penalty payment greater than or equal to the penalty paid under New Jersey’s current 
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mechanism.  It is possible that my model would achieve the same result, but it is difficult to 
compare since my model also allows firms to abate pollution, which alters their cost function.  
One important caveat is that much of NJ’s electricity comes from nuclear power plants which do 
not emit carbon dioxide.  Therefore, under my rate standard proposal, nuclear plants would not 
be required to purchase RECs.  This may limit the demand of RECs under a rate standard in New 
Jersey.  If interstate trading were allowed, demand for RECs may increase.  While interstate 
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